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THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DANGERS
OF ESTABLISHMENT
Richard S. Kay*
If we are interested in the particular value of the words of the
First Amendment that prohibit the making of laws "respecting an
establishment of religion," Canada promises to provide a useful
ground for comparison. Canada represents a political society very
much like that of the United States, but its constitutional guaran-
tees concerning religion are significantly different. I will give a brief
report on the state of constitutional law in Canada insofar as it
touches questions of religion. I will then suggest what the Canadian
experience may show about the range of values protected by the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Finally, I will discuss
some reasons to be cautious in making any easy comparisons be-
tween these two legal systems.
I. RELIGION IN THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
Translated to the terminology of the United States Constitution,
Canada has a free exercise clause but no establishment clause. Not
only does Canada lack an establishment clause, it has numerous in-
stances of what, under American judicial interpretations of the First
Amendment, amount to the establishment of religion. The Canadian
head of state, the Queen of the United Kingdom, must by law be a
Protestant.' The Constitution Act, 1982, which contains, among
other things, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, opens
with a preamble that declares that Canada is founded "upon princi-
ples that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."2
More substantially, Canadian governments have a long and well
* William J. Brennan Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. This paper is a revised
version of remarks delivered at a panel entitled "Do We Need An Establishment Clause?" at the
Bicentennial Conference on Church/State Studies sponsored by the DePaul University College of
Law Center for Church/State Studies held on December 6 & 7, 1991.
1. See R.S.C., ch. 1-21 (1985) (Can.) (definition of crown). The religious qualification is a
matter of British law. Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.).
2. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pmbl.
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accepted practice of funding religiously operated schools. In fact,
the Constitution Act, 1867, makes the support of denominational
schools in Ontario and Quebec a constitutionally required public
duty.3 To alleviate any concern that the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms might have brought into question
the continued validity of that duty, the Charter contains an explicit
provision declaring that it has no effect on the constitutional rights
or privileges of "denominational, separate or dissentient schools."4
That Charter, adopted in 1982, created Canada's only constitu-
tionally entrenched rules protecting individual choice in matters of
religion. The text of section 2 reads: "Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms: (a) Freedom of conscience and religion
... "' The Charter also contains in section 15 an equality provi-
sion that explicitly identifies a number of prohibited grounds of dis-
crimination, including religion. But beyond this point, the text does
not go. It has no constitutional language that could reasonably be
construed as mandating any kind of general separation of church
and state whatsoever.
It is not accurate to say, however, that Canada has no constitu-
tionally grounded protections against public favoritism towards reli-
gion. In fact, on the few occasions that Canadian courts have had to
apply section 2(a), they have sometimes used that provision to inval-
idate official actions that seem, on their face, more like promotion of
religion than interference with religious choice. That is, using the
American terminology, they have held invalid measures that seem to
present establishment as well as free exercise problems. The leading
case is Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd.,' decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 1985. In that case, the court held invalid a fed-
eral criminal law that required the closing of certain businesses on
Sundays. The case presents a distinct contrast to the constitutional
doctrine applied in a set of American cases decided in 1961, in
which the United States Supreme Court upheld several state Sun-
day laws against challenges based on the Establishment, Free Exer-
cise, and Equal Protection Clauses.7
3. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 93; see re Bill 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can.).
4. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §
9.
5. Id. § 2(a). Section 2(b) adds the following related language: "(b) Freedom of thought, be-
lief, opinion and expression. ... Id. § 2(b).
6. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
7. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S.
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The Court in Big M Drug Mart, Ltd. relied on an expansive defi-
nition of freedom of religion to reach its result. The reasoning was
as follows: Section 2(a)'s securing of "freedom of conscience and
religion" meant that the state could take no action which had either
the purpose or the effect of coercing or otherwise putting pressure
on the religious choices of individuals. In this case, the legislative
history of the statute at issue, the Lord's Day Act, made absolutely
clear that it had been enacted with the principal purpose of encour-
aging religious observance on Sundays.8 That being the case, there
was no need to consider in detail the actual effect that the require-
ment of Sunday closings had on the religious practices of individu-
als.9 In reaching this conclusion, the Canadian Supreme Court ex-
plicitly differed with the United States Supreme Court's holding
that a statute which was originally designed to promote religious
observance could, over time, come to acquire a secular purpose. 10
The following year, however, the Supreme Court of Canada up-
held another Sunday closing law, this time a provincial one, in Re-
gina v. Edwards Books & Art, Ltd." Unlike Big M Drug Mart,
Ltd., the weight of the evidence was that this recent enactment was
not motivated by religious considerations. Rather, it was intended as
a secular pause day. 2 Nevertheless, the law still had an effect on
religious practice for observers of sabbaths on days other than Sun-
day by forcing them to choose between violating their religious
precepts or closing two days a week to their competitive disadvan-
tage.1 3 This amounted to a limitation -of the freedom of religion of
section 2(a) and required the court to consider the law under section
1 of the Charter. That provision allows the Charter rights to be lim-
ited as long as such limitation is "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.""' The Canadian Supreme Court has devel-
617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
8. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 331.
9. Id. at 333.
10. Id. at 334-35; cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 446-52 (1961) (holding that the
Maryland Sunday closing laws are not laws respecting the establishment of religion).
11. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.).
12. Id. at 744-47.
13. Id. at 762-68. The same impact raised a free exercise question for the United States Su-
preme Court in the 1961 cases. That Court held the burden on religion insufficient to warrant a
holding of unconstitutionality. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
14. Edwards Books & Art, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 713, 768. The Court in Big M Drug Mart,
Ltd., did not undertake this inquiry with respect to the limitation on section 2(a) rights because it
found it inappropriate where the limitation was not an incidental aspect of legislation with a
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oped a multi-part test for this analysis which need not be fully dis-
cussed here. It is enough to say that it amounts, in essence, to a kind
of balancing test familiar to students of American constitutional
law. 15 In this case, the Court considered the law's impact on reli-
gious choice to be indirect and less than absolute. It also noted the
many exemptions the statute provided, which relieved many (but
not all) non-Sunday observers from its prohibitions. The fairly re-
stricted burden on religion that remained, the Court concluded, was
justifiable in light of the state's reasonable policy of promoting a
common day for rest and recreation.' 6
It is obvious that certain features of the still sparse Canadian con-
stitutional doctrine on freedom of conscience suggest considerable
breadth and flexibility in the potential power of courts to review
state actions touching on religious matters. In its terms, section 2(a)
is concerned only with individual freedom of religious choice. By
interpreting it as barring any official measure that is motivated by a
desire to influence religious practice, however, the Court has neces-
sarily brought into question many state actions that, on their sur-
face, make no restriction on behavior but merely aid or approve reli-
gion. Moreover, by suggesting that even indirect impact on religious
choice can trigger a section 1 inquiry, the Court has left open the
possibility that even unintended public promotion of religious activ-
ity may create a constitutional violation. Both these possibilities
leave open to constitutional challenge official actions that when they
occur in the United States, usually raise questions under the consti-
tutional prohibition on the establishment of religion. Thus, relying
principally on the two cases discussed, the Ontario Court of Appeal
has held invalid laws requiring religious instruction, opening
prayers, and Bible readings in the public schools. 7 The same result
in the United States, of course, was premised on a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 8
constitutional purpose but was, itself, the essential objective of the challenged law. [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, 352-53 (Can.).
15. This test was first set out at length in Regina v. Oakes, [1986 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.), but
has been both elaborated upon and revised in subsequent cases. See Committee for the Common-
wealth of Can. v. Canada, [19911 1 S.C.R. 139, 156-58; McKinney v. University of Guelph,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 280-81 (Can.).
16. Edward Books & Art, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 758-59.
17. Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario, [1990] 71 O.R.2d 341 (C.A.); Zylderburg v.
Sudbury Bd. of Educ., [1988] 65 O.R.2d 641 (Can.).
18. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
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II. THE ENDS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Does the experience of Canada with its freedom of religion provi-
sion tell us anything about the utility of our own religion clauses?
To the extent that Canada is like the United States, it may present
a model of what our constitutional regime might look like were we
to have only the second of the two religion clauses, the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
In terms of securing a society with a healthy and tolerant rela-
tionship between state and religion, Canada certainly doesn't look
all that bad. It surely is not a place where oppression and intoler-
ance have run amok. Quite the contrary, Canada is a country with a
justified reputation as one of the most liberal and decent societies in
the world. This is by no means to say that its history has been free
of narrowness, repression, or bigotry,19 but these phenomena have
been notably isolated. The relevant comparison is with the United
States, and I think it is fair to say that with respect to religious
tolerance, the apparent Canadian record is at least as good as the
American one.
If that is the case, it might do no harm, and might even do some
good, to follow the Canadian example and try to get along only with
a constitutional guarantee of free exercise. One obvious lesson from
the Canadian cases is the potential of a toleration provision like the
Free Exercise Clause. The Canadians have been quite able to assign
to their freedom of conscience provision much of the work for which
we have used the Establishment Clause. Abandonment of the Estab-
lishment Clause does not necessarily entail an abandonment of, at
least, some of the constitutional results that it has been interpreted
to require. 0
Another way of reaching the same result may be to retain the
Establishment Clause but to interpret it more narrowly. It is some-
times suggested that the Establishment Clause should be applied
only to reach government action that in some way exerts a coercive
pressure on religious choice. I take it that this proposes a situation
19. Some instances are recorded in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Walter v. Attorney Gen. of
Atla., [19691 S.C.R. 383 (upholding a statute limiting communal landholding by Hutterites);
Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (invalidating as discriminatory a prohibition of
leafleting by Jehovah's Witnesses).
20. My discussion of Establishment Clause doctrine is based on the interpretation of that provi-
sion in the United States Supreme Court. The original intended meaning is, of course, a matter of
continuing dispute.
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substantially identical to the one in Canada where the freedom of
religion clause has been held to reach a wide array of practices that
have the purpose or effect of exerting a direct or an indirect pres-
sure on free religious practices. This would retain that part of Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence that can be reformulated as an-
ticoercive. The opinion of the Court in the recent decision holding
invalid officially sponsored prayers at a middle school graduation,
for example, focused almost exclusively on the indirect pressure to
participate created by that occasion, notwithstanding its formally
voluntary nature.21 This limited interpretation of the Establishment
Clause has been seriously proposed in some of the literature22 and
was argued to be the sole object of the clause before the Supreme
Court in the graduation prayer case.2" It would, in effect, convert
the Establishment Clause into a prophylactic against potential free
exercise problems, or perhaps it would read the religion clauses as a
single compound prohibition against a wide range of direct and indi-
rect coercive official behavior.24
The question of the special value of the Establishment Clause,
therefore, reduces to the value of limits on the other, noncoercive
governmental action that the Establishment Clause has been held to
reach (i.e., those instances of church-state association, promotion, or
cooperation which do not, even on a broad interpretation, appear to
put pressure on individual religious choice). What is the value of
those other kinds of limitations? What are the harms that they pro-
tect us against?
I would like to posit three admittedly crude categories of noncoer-
21. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The earlier school prayer cases also depended, in
part on this idea. See, e.g., Engel,' 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
22. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 933 (1986); Scott J. Ward, Note, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause
Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions, 98 YALE L.J. 1739 (1989).
23. Brief for Petitioners, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014). While the
opinion of the Court by Justice Kennedy placed almost exclusive reliance on a finding of coercion,
it did not define that as the exclusive object of the clause. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-61. Four
Justices of the five-Justice majority joined concurring opinions that made clear they believed the
Establishment Clause had a wider reach. Id. at 2661, 2667.
24. A somewhat different interpretation of the same idea of a single compound prohibition was
offered in PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 111-12 (1962). But see Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667-78 (Souter, J., concurring) (re-
jecting the idea that "the Framers meant the establishment clause simply to ornament the First
Amendment").
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cive injury that state-church association may pose. The first is the
contribution such association may make to a general atmosphere of
religious intolerance. Continuous, official, favorable treatment of one
form of religious belief may communicate to society an implicit hi-
erarchy of beliefs or a preference for belief over nonbelief. Such an
environment may facilitate other more direct and ultimately coer-
cive government actions against disfavored religious groups.2 5 It
should be noted that the ultimate evil here is still a form of coer-
cion, but the particular prohibited practice may be sufficiently re-
mote from that evil that it could not be reached even by a very
broad reading of a mere toleration provision.
The second category encompasses those injuries which a church-
state association may work on each of those institutions considered
separately. The recognition of such injuries posits a constitutional
assumption that each plays a distinct and essential role in society
and that each has appropriate characteristics and modes of acting.
It may be argued that too close a relationship might injure the state
by influencing it to adopt a more absolutist and irrational form of
decisionmaking.26 It may injure the church by domesticating it with
the more worldly outlook that is proper for secular institutions, but
that can water down the intensity of religious belief and practice. 7
Thus, some kind of separation may reduce the risk of mutual cor-
ruption of church and state.
The last category of noncoercive injury that the American estab-
lishment law may prevent consists of the possible emotional suffer-
ing and assault to dignity that official action in support of or in asso-
ciation with religion may produce. Such government action may be
perceived as devaluing the religious convictions of nonconformers.
Such an affront to minorities may not, when stated in the abstract,
25. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-53 ("A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom
of belief or conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real not imposed."); LEO
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 135-39 (rev. ed. 1967).
26. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("When the government appropri-
ates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theological decree.'. . . Those who disagree
no longer are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of a higher authority
who is beyond reproach." (citations omitted)); see also William P. Marshall, Public Square and
the Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
27. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661-67 (Blackmun, J., concurring). That the wall of separation is
necessary to maintain the church from secular corruption, as well as public coercion, was made
clear in Roger Williams's use of that metaphor discussed by Mark DeWolfe Howe. See MARK
DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-10 (1965).
1992]
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appear particularly serious especially since we are now, by hypothe-
sis, dealing with action without coercive effect, direct or indirect.2 8
It may be equally reasonable, however, to take account of the core
nature of religious values in establishing personal identity.2 9 The
strength of such feelings is reflected in a remark by the father of the
plaintiff in the recent graduation prayer case. Referring to the reac-
tion of his Jewish family to a patently sectarian prayer given at an
earlier graduation, he said they felt "absolutely humiliated. 13 ° This
kind of injury may be recognized as the type identified by Justice
O'Connor in her separate opinions arguing that the Establishment
Clause should prohibit actions "endorsing or disapproving" of any
religion. Such actions "send a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community. ' 31
One interpretation of the Canadian experience, where the consti-
tutional rules have focused on coercion in religious matters by the
government, suggests that we have exaggerated the severity of the
noncoercive kinds of injuries I have listed. As I have noted, Cana-
dian society is, on the whole, liberal, democratic, tolerant, and de-
cent. It certainly does not appear to be plainly more prone than the
United States to any of the problems that I have identified as the
peculiar concern of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Moreover,
existing doctrine in this country is not without its costs. The deliber-
ate exclusion of religious concerns from public activity is itself per-
ceived by some religious groups as evincing a dangerous and hostile
attitude toward religion.32 It is understood by others as depriving
our public decisionmaking of a critical moral dimension.3 3 If noth-
ing else, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Establishment
Clause has created a doctrinal nightmare for anyone interested in
28. See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351 (1991); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctri-
nal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266
(1987).
29. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1113, 1164-66 (1988):
30. Kevin Cullen, Prayer Challenge: High Court to Hear Church-State Lawsuit, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1991, at 29.
31. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(stating that "[ulntutored devotion" to the concept of neutrality can lead to "a brooding and
pervasive dedication to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious").
33. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 932
(1989).
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understanding our constitutional law of religion. 4
III. THE LIMITS OF COMPARISON
Notwithstanding the relatively happy experience of Canada with-
out the aid of an establishment clause, I think we should be cautious
about concluding that our constitutional system can do without one.
There are at least four reasons to doubt that we can easily answer
the American question based on the Canadian experience.
First, while our societies are very similar, they are by no means
identical. In particular, one reading of Canadian history would sug-
gest that Canadian constitutional assumptions may not have been
influenced to the same extent as the American Constitution by a
variety of dissentient religious groups. Canada was created on the
premise that it consisted of two founding peoples. A central, al-
though not exclusive, role for the two corresponding major Christian
religions, mainstream Protestantism and Roman Catholicism," may
have followed from that fact. While the Canadian population has, in
this century, become increasingly- diverse, it is possible to speculate
that a somewhat more ordered sense of social-religious expectations
may partially explain its relatively satisfactory experience without a
constitutional prohibition on establishment.
Second, a critical difference between Canada and the United
States is assumed by the very comparison at issue. That is that the
United States, unlike Canada, has had an Establishment Clause for
two hundred years, and fairly prominent Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence for about fifty years. That fact has political and cul-
tural, as well as legal, significance. A United States deprived of its
establishment law would, in that sense, be very different from Ca-
nada, which has never had one. The message conveyed by such a
change to courts and political actors would convey a particularly
clear message of preference for religion. Similarly, public actions
34. See Smith, supra note 28, at 269.
35. See R. DOUGLAS FRANCIS ET AL., DESTINIES: CANADIAN HISTORY SINCE CONFEDERATION
16-17 (1988). It has been argued that the differing size and structures of churches in Canada have
prevented the development of the consensus in favor of religious pluralism that has prevailed in
the United States. See John Webster Grant 'At Least You Knew Where You Stood With Them':
Reflections on Pluralism in Canada and the United States, 2 STUD. RELIGION 340 (1973). For a
discussion of Canadian church history that confirms the assumed centrality of the two Christian
religions in the church-state issues of the period from 1867 to 1929 and which also discusses the
increasing presence of marginal religious groups, see ROBERT T. HAND, A HISTORY OF THE
CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 344-76 (1976).
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undertaken pursuant to such a change might be perceived quite dif-
ferently than the same actions in a regime where they had never
been forbidden.
Third, the easy conclusion about the absence of serious injury re-
sulting from public-religious association in Canada may not be en-
tirely accurate. The kinds of harms I have described which a separa-
tion of church and state are supposed to ameliorate are difficult to
measure or even to identify. Certainly with respect to the problem
of the emotional impact of public approval of certain religions and
implicit disapproval of others, it may be that the more severe the
effect, the more its victims may suppress the evidence of it. Thus,
the United States may be better off than Canada in this respect by
virtue of its anti-establishment jurisprudence, even if this is not ob-
vious upon superficial examination.
Fourth, and finally, the claim that Canada's success without an
establishment clause shows the superfluity of such a constitutional
rule may prove too much. Canada appears to possess as liberal and
tolerant a society as that of the United States, but that was equally
true before 1982, when Canada had no constitutional protection of
religion at all. That would mean that our Free Exercise Clause as
well as our Establishment Clause is expendable. There is certainly
much to be said for the proposition that constitutional rules, in gen-
eral, are only a marginal influence on social and even official con-
duct. For example, the United Kingdom has managed passably well
with no constitutional protection of individual rights at all, although
there is now some noticeable dissatisfaction with that state of af-
fairs.3" Furthermore, I doubt that many observers would, on the ba-
sis of the Canadian experience, be ready to jettison the religion
clauses altogether.
As someone who has studied the Canadian constitution and who
admires both the Canadian legal system and the Canadian people, I
believe there is much to learn from Canada. I would be very glad to
see some constitutional influence on this continent flow south as well
as north.37 That hope applies, equally to matters of church and state,
but every exercise of comparison must be undertaken with a careful
attention to the differences in context that are inevitably present.
36. See, e.g., The Constitution Revisited, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 65.
37. For a discussion of the influence of American constitutional law in Canada, see Jamie Cam-
eron, The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudi-
cation, in CHARTER LITIGATION 69 (Robert J. Sharpe ed., 1987).
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The lessons that Canadian law has to teach Americans about our
constitutional law of religion are anything but conclusive.

